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1 Introduction 
The recent finance and growth literature has concluded financial development is a 
robust determinant of economic growth (Levine 2005). However, the case of China has 
reignited the debate on the role of informal financial arrangements in a country’s 
economic growth (Stiglitz 1990; Arnott and Stiglitz 1990). Allen, Qian and Qian (2005, 
hereafter referred to as ‘AQQ’) argue that the key driver of the country’s growth has 
been the private sector and this sector tends to rely on informal finance and governance 
mechanisms rather than formal financing channels. Others argue that the role of 
informal financing and governance mechanisms in supporting the growth of private 
sector is likely to be limited. The evidence suggests that the private enterprises 
performance is associated with access to formal finance (bank loans), and more so, 
firms using formal financing sources grow faster than those financed by alternative 
channels (Cull and Xu 2005; Maksimovic et al. 2008). Using large firm level data, Du 
and Girma (2007b) show that it is inappropriate to draw a general conclusion such as 
formal (or informal) financial system is more important for firm growth in China, as the 
relationship between financing sources and growth depends on firm ownership and 
growth channel. 
This paper extends our previous analyses by linking directly the relationship between 
finance and growth with firm size. There are two reasons why firm size is a crucial 
consideration in this context. First, one of the ongoing research questions in the finance 
and growth literature is to identify the distributional effects of financial development: 
will financial development exert a favourably positive impact on small firms as some 
theories predict (Beck et al. 2005, 2007), or will it disproportionately assist bigger firms 
as others argue (e.g. Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990)? There is some empirical work in 
this area based on firm level data from US (Cetorelli and Strahan 2006) and Europe (for 
example, Italy in Guiso et al. 2004); and other countries (as in Kumar et al. 2001). The 
results generally suggest that small firms benefit disproportionally more from well-
developed financial system. This bears important implication for the political economy 
of financial system development agenda. It is perhaps more so for the developing world 
like China where smaller firms are likely to be more financially constrained (Claessens 
2006) and financial sector reforms are still underway.  
The second reason has to do with the state of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in China. Two facts are in stark contrast to each other. On one hand, the 
contribution of SMEs in China’s fast-growing economy is substantial. According to the 
definition of the national statistics,1 at least 85.8 per cent of the manufacturing firms are 
small firms in 1998, and this number increases to 98 per cent in 2005. By 2005, small 
firms account for 40 per cent of the total industrial outputs, 35.9 per cent of the total 
industrial value-added, 38.6 per cent of the total assets, and nearly 29.7 per cent of the 
total profit. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence and some survey studies suggest that 
SMEs are the most financially constrained. For example, according to the World Bank 
Investment Climate Survey for China conducted for the period 2001 and 2002, SMEs in 
                                                 
1  According to the China Statistical Yearbook (1999, 2006), firm size is defined by the National 
Statistical Bureau according to firm’s total employment, total sales and total assets. For manufacturing 
industrial firms, small firms are below 300 employees, 3,000,000 yuan total sales, and 4,000,000 yuan 
total assets; big firms are above 2,000 employees, 30,000,000 yuan total sales, and 40,000,000 yuan 
total assets; medium firms are between the two sets of figures.    2
China face much more serious credit constraints and limited access to private finance 
than large firms even compared to other Asian countries (Dollar et al. 2003). Another 
survey conducted in 2002 on start-up firms suggests self-raised funding was the major 
financing source (Garcia-Fontes 2005) of SMEs. It is therefore interesting and important 
to investigate how this part of the economy that had not been supported by the formal 
financial system managed to survive and thrive.  
In this paper, we attempt to provide a systematic analysis of the relationship between 
firm total factor productivity (TFP) growth and financing pattern for firms of different 
sizes in China, using the most comprehensive and up to date firm-level dataset 
available. In addition to domestic bank loans and self-raised finance, this dataset allows 
us to consider other sources of finance, namely state budget and foreign finance, that 
existing studies did not manage to analyse. We seek to answer the following three 
questions: (i) What is the financing pattern of firms of different size? (ii) Does firm size 
affect how financing sources determine firm TFP growth? (iii) Does the relationship 
between firm size, financing sources and productivity depend on ownership structure? 
These are important questions, not only because their answers have implications for 
China on how to reform its weak financial system to maximize the country’s growth 
potential, but also offer useful lessons to other developing and transition economies in 
which the principal financial institutions are state-owned and the private sector starts to 
dominate the economic landscape. To preview our results, controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of finance variables, we find that the extent to which financing sources 
matter for growth vary according to firm size and firm ownership.  
2 The  literature 
2.1  Source of finance and firm growth 
The relationship between financial development and economic growth is well 
established in the literature (see Levine 2005 for a general review). Several channels 
through which a well-developed financial system can encourage economic growth are 
identified in the theoretical literature and supported by empirical evidence. For example, 
financial system conveys information ex ante regarding the value of potential 
investment projects to individual savers; it monitors and motivates firm’s managers and 
ensures that effective corporate governance mechanism to be in place; its risk-pooling 
nature allows individual agents to undertake risky projects with high return; and it 
lowers transaction cost through specialization, technological innovation and growth. 
However, the mainstream theories and evidence are developed with default focus on 
formal financial system. While they are perhaps pertinent in the economies where the 
formal financial system dominates, they are incapable of characterizing the functions of 
different financial sectors when there is a coexistence of formal financial sectors and 
informal financial sectors, commonly known as financial dualism (see a review by the 
OECD by Germidis et al. 1991). 
The existing theories on informal financial system and their role on the economy are 
limited to those of Stiglitz (1990) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1990). Set in the context of 
credit and insurance markets, they have built models to evaluate the effects of peer 
monitoring systems of informal (or ‘non-market’ as used by the authors) lenders and 
insurers. The authors demonstrate that, given the right incentives, informal lenders and 
insurers may stand in a superior position than their formal counterparts to address the   3
insufficient informational problems and to generate improved welfare for the borrowers 
and the insured.  
Counter arguments contend that informal financial arrangements play only a 
complementary role to formal financial systems by serving the low end of the market 
but can never be a substitute for the formal system because of their inadequate 
monitoring capability and enforcement mechanisms (Maksimovic et al. 2008). 
Unfortunately, the relative advantages of informal financial system in low-income 
economies have not been empirically tested and investigations are still being conducted 
on a case-by-case basis. 
2.2  China’s finance-growth puzzle 
While the finance and growth literature has consistently upheld the belief that a healthy 
financial system is necessary for a country to maintain economic growth (see Levine 
2005), China, has been considered a counter example. Regarding the role of formal and 
informal financial system in supporting the Chinese economy, there seems to be a 
controversy. The research findings by AQQ (2005) contend that the key driver of the 
country’s growth has been the private sector, which tends to rely on informal finance 
and governance mechanisms rather than formal financing channels. There is also 
evidence to show that non-state financing sources are generally more efficient in 
promoting output growth at provincial level between 1985 and 1998 (Liu and Li 2001).  
By contrast, using the recent Investment Climate Survey (ICS) conducted by the World 
Bank, Cull and Xu (2005) find that the performance of Chinese private enterprises is 
actually associated with access to bank loans, along with enterprise managers’ risk 
perception about property rights and local legal conditions. Maksimovic et al. (2008), 
using the same data, find that firms which use formal financing sources grow faster than 
those which use alternative channels. They argue that the role of informal financing
2 
and governance mechanisms in supporting the growth of private sector firms is likely to 
be limited. Similarly, Cheng and Degryse (2007) provide evidence to show that, at 
provincial level, banks contribute more significantly to local economic growth than non-
bank financial institutions, especially in regions with foreign entry. Hence, they attribute 
the improved efficiency of the banking industry to the ongoing financial reform, and 
particularly to the commercialization of state-owned commercial banks, deregulations 
of foreign entry and liberalization of interest rates.  
As more and more data become available, empirical studies based on large-scale firm 
level data started emerging recently. Among others, Cull et al. (2007) examine the role 
of trade credit in China as an informal financing channel, and conclude that it does not 
play an economically significant role; instead, the significance may even decline as the 
formal financing allocation becomes more efficient. Du and Girma (2007b) analyse the 
controversy regarding the role of formal and informal financing channels in China’s 
economic growth, and argue that this is due to the difference in the datasets and 
                                                 
2  As defined by Maksimovic et al. (2008), informal financial institutions include non-market institutions 
such as credit co-operatives, moneylenders, informal credit and insurance, rotating savings and credit 
associations, which do not rely on formal contractual obligations enforced through a codified legal 
system.    4
methodologies used in the above empirical results. The authors find it inappropriate to 
draw a general conclusion of the relative importance of formal and informal financial 
sectors, which appear to complement each other in supporting different types of firms’ 
growth. 
2.3  Firm size and financial system development 
Firm size has long been recognized to be of critical importance in the distribution of 
financial system development. Two contrasting theories are most representative. Some 
suggest that because small firms tend to hurt the most as a result of not being able to 
access finance due to underlying weaknesses of institutional environment, they hence 
benefit disproportionately from financial system’s development, which relaxes their 
financing constraints. Large firms tend to internalize many of the capital allocation 
functions carried out by financial markets and financial intermediaries, thus they tend to 
benefit less from the development of financial markets and institutions compared to 
their smaller counterparts (Beck et al. 2005, 2007). Among empirical work on finance 
and firm size, some authors also find favourable effects of financial development on 
small firms. Guiso et al. (2004) find that effects of financial development on enhancing 
successful entry, increasing competition, and promoting growth are larger for small 
firms than large firms in Italy. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) find that uncompetitive 
local banking markets in the US represents a barrier to the entry of new firms because 
the new firms have difficulty accessing credit.  
In contrast, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) find small firms cannot afford financial 
service and financial development simply boosts aggregate growth by helping big firms. 
Some other research reaching similar results argues that bigger firms, compared to 
smaller firms, are more likely to depend on long-term financing and larger loans for 
their development. Although quite a number of empirical studies have provided cross-
countries and industries evidences, the role of firm size in the finance-growth linkage 
appears an ultimate empirical issue which has to be determined on a case-by-case basis 
(Beck et al. 2005). 
3  Financial sectors in China and firms’ financing pattern3 
As in many other developing countries, formal financial sectors and informal financial 
sectors comprise China’s financial system. The formal finance sector covers a wide 
variety of institutions while the mechanisms and agents of the informal sector are 
equally diverse. These can be represented on three levels – the Ministry of Finance, 
Banks and other financial intermediaries, and capital markets (see Appendix 1 Table 1). 
The Ministry of Finance takes a predominant role in the economy by administering 
macroeconomic policies and the national annual budget, and by handling the fiscal 
policy and government expenditure. At firm level, state budget appropriations are the 
direct investment from the state budget by central and local governments.  
                                                 
3  This part draws upon Du and Girma (2007b). Appendix A, Table 1 provides the schematized structure 
of China’s financial sectors, which was first presented in Du and Girma (2007b).   5
The second level is composed of various banks and non-bank financial institutions, 
regulated by the People’s Bank of China. They are the major players in the formal 
sector, which is in fact dominated by four large state-owned commercial banks claiming 
around 70 per cent market share in terms of both national savings and loans. These 
banks used to carry some policy-related functions in the past and this partially explains 
the soft-budget constraint phenomenon (Lin et al. 1998), the large amount of non-
performing loans (e.g. Ma and Gung 2002) and their lack of operational efficiency 
(Berger et al. 2008). Furthermore, it has been argued that the Chinese banking sector is 
regionally segmented; financial resources are not mobile and they are allocated 
inefficiently (Cull and Xu 2003; Boyreau-Debray and Wei 2005).  
The third level lies China’s emerging capital market. Compared to most countries in the 
world, even developing economies, the Chinese capital market is much smaller in terms 
of the size of stock market.
4 The two Chinese stock exchange markets were established 
in the early 1990s, and by 2004 only 1,337 companies were listed in the market, which 
represent only about 1 per cent of the manufacturing industry in terms of industrial 
value added. The stock market is thus by no means an important financing channel for 
the majority of domestic firms. Apart from being small, China’s capital markets lack 
efficiency, which may be due to being policy-driven (Heilmann 2002) or ineffective 
regulations (AQQ 2005).  
Informal financial sectors are comprised of savers, lenders and borrowers that can be 
individuals, firms or associations that act as financial intermediaries but not regulated 
by authorities. Three types of informal financial operators are classified: individual 
moneylenders, associations and partnership firms. As has been previously documented 
in other developing countries, one of the striking characteristics of the informal 
financial sector is the importance of personal relationship (Germidis et al. 1991). The 
importance of reputation and relationships in China’s private sector alternative 
financing and governance mechanism is also discussed in depth by AQQ (2005). 
From the demand side, the majority of Chinese firms are typically financed from a 
mixture of debt and equity. Bank loans constitute firm’s debt, and almost exclusively 
from domestic banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. Equity, on the other hand, 
can be distinguished by financing source: from state budget appropriations, self-raised 
sources and foreign investment. Equity finance from state budget appropriations refer to 
the appropriations in the budget of the central and local governments earmarked for 
capital investment. Self-raised finance, often the most important source of finance for 
many firms, includes firms’ finance from capital markets, bonds issued by individual 
enterprises, individual borrowing and funds channelled through local governments, or 
other bodies. This is similar to what is referred to as informal finance in Maksimovic 
et al. (2008). In a firm’s capital, self-raised finance is reflected as three broad types of 
paid-in-capital: individual capital, collective capital and corporate (or legal person) 
capital. Finally, many domestic firms also finance their activities with funds from 
foreign investors or other foreign funding sources. 
                                                 
4  See the comparison AQQ (2005) make with the widely referred sample in La Porta et al. (1998). For 
example, China’s total value traded over GDP is only 0.11 while the LLSV-sample average is 0.27; its 
market capitalization over GDP is 0.32 while the sample average is 0.47.   6
The role of the four financing resources in China has changed substantially during 
1980s and 1990s due to the economic reforms and financial liberation (Liu and Li 
2001). State budgetary allocation, the dominant source of funding in the pre-reformed 
era, has been substituted by domestic bank loans and self-raised funds. The progression 
has been particularly facilitated by the SOE reforms, which are characterized by 
privatization and marketization, continuous financial system reform and regional 
decentralization. China’s open-door policy allowed a considerable level of foreign 
investment in the capital market, the role of which is increasingly visible in firms’ 
financing mix.  
4 Methodology 
To assess the impact of financing sources on firm growth performance, the following 
reduced form equation is specified: 
it it it t i t i k it D OWN X FIN Growth ε φ δ γ β α + + ′ + + + =
− − ' ' '
1 , 1 , ,    ( 1 )  
Where firm performance is measured by firm TFP Growth using Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) approach for firm i at time t; FIN is a vector of financing source variables: state 
finance, domestic banks loan, self-raised finance and foreign investments, defined by 
the share of each source in a firm’s total finance.5 The vector X, a set of control 
variables that are found to determine firm growth in the literature, includes firm age and 
size (measured by the number of total employees) and their quadratic terms (e.g. Evans 
1987; Geroski 1995; Caves 1998 and Cabral and Mata 2003), initial TFP level to 
control for firm’s technological endowment, export to capture the expected 
performance-enhancing effects of export activities that have been widely documented 
across a number of countries, including China (see Kraay 1999). Similarly, innovation, 
measured by the percentage of new product sales in total sales, is also included to test 
the presence of innovation-driving growth (Jovanovic 1982). D is the full set of firm’s 
ownership, industrial, time and regional dummies and ε is a random error term.  
Among the econometric issues that may bias OLS estimator, heterogeneity, selectivity 
and endogeneity are more common for firm-level analyses than others. In our case, first 
of all, although firm ownership, location and industrial sector variations are controlled 
through dummy variables, firm heterogeneity may still be prevalent within a narrowly 
defined sector. Second, as growth is observed only among firms that have survived, it is 
necessary to assess potential selection bias.6 Third, endogeneity issue can arise when 
firm capital structure is correlated with some unobserved factors that also impact on 
firm growth, even though the financial structure variables are lagged by one period.7  
                                                 
5  Since the four shares add up to one, the state finance is set as the base group whenever all four 
financing sources are present, and thus the coefficients βs of finance source variables are interpreted 
as the marginal effect relative to the base group.  
6  Due to the construction of the dataset, for non-SOEs, the survived firms are those included in the 
NBS’ census, i.e. the firms that maintain an annual turnover of more than 5 million yuan.  
7  For example, the unobservable managers’ ability that affect firm performance, as well as affect the 
chances of getting finance (maybe one from some sources).   7
With this in view, the authors assess the above-mentioned issues by exploring several 
estimators, starting with OLS estimator with robust standard errors allowing for 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation, outlier robust regression 
(Rousseeuw and Leroy 1987) to address firm heterogeneity, which offer estimates that 
are not sensitive to the presence of extreme values and effectively control for outliers. 
To assess selectivity, instead of using the popular Heckman approach (1976), which is 
not appropriate for panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity, this paper adopts 
its extension to linear unobserved heterogeneity panel data models by Wooldridge 
(1995) can identify the extent of selectivity bias in the model. The procedure is a two-
stage estimator: in the first stage, non-selection hazard variables are estimated by a 
sample selection model of firm survival on a yearly basis, which are included in the 
original model to correct for the selectivity bias at the second stage. The variables 
included in the selection equations are quadratic terms of firm’s size and age, TFP level, 
firm’s export and innovation activity and industry exit rate. These are variables that are 
typically used in the firm survival literature (e.g. Dunne et al. 1989 and Mata et al. 
1995).  
In a case such as ours, when the endogeneity problem induced by multiple endogenous 
variables with discreteness (finance source variables are truncated), Wooldridge (2002, 
2005) shows that the usual IV or control function estimators, such as Smith and 
Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988), fail to deliver consistent estimates. To 
the authors’ best knowledge, the only available econometric technique for tackling such 
a problem is the correction function approach of Wooldridge (2005), which is an 
extension of the standard IV estimator. The study has shown that augmenting the 
baseline model, such as Equation (1) with appropriately defined correction functions, 
will deliver consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. 
Assume FINj (j = 1, 2, 3), the truncated finance structure variables,8 take standard Tobit 
reduced forms: 
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where  ] , | [ Z X ξ ~ iid N(0,
2 σ ), and X is the vector of covariates described in equation 
(1). Z is the vector of the available instrumental variables for which  0 ) ' ( = X Z E , or in 
other words, they are assumed to be exogenous and redundant in determining firm 
growth in the structural conditional expectation. Wooldridge (2005) shows that ignoring 
individual firm indicator notation, the correction function for models with truncated 
endogenous variables can be generated as follows: 
          ( ) ( ) σ ϑ σ ϑ / , ,
2 r Z X hj Φ ⋅ = ,   ( ) i i i z x r , , 1 ≡  and  ( ) 2 1, , ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ o ≡    (3) 
where (.) Φ  is the cumulative normal density. Then equation (1) can be modified by 
adding the correction function and the interaction terms of the endogenous variables 
FIN with the mean variance of each element of the vector X, for the omitted variable 
bias that plagues the usual IV estimators: 
                                                 
8  In the case of four financing source variables included, the share of state budget is the omitted group 
in the estimation.    8
Growth it =α + β j
'FINijt j ∑ +χ'Xit + δj
'FINijt(Xit −X  t)
j ∑ + ρijthijt j ∑ +ϕ'OWNit +φ'Di+εit      (4) 
Equation (4) is then estimated by OLS with corrected standard errors by bootstrapping 
to account for the fact that correction functions are the generated regressors. A test of 
joint significance of the correction functions and the interaction terms provides a test of 
exogeneity of the finance variables. 
To estimate correct functions, valid instrumental variables that are relevant and 
exogenous to firm growth must be provided. To this end, the authors employed firms’ 
political affiliation indicators, regional level or industrial level indicators of market 
condition, financial development and legal environment. Political affiliations are a set 
of dummy variables that indicate the administrative level at which firms are being 
‘supervised’. More than half of Chinese firms (including private firms) are affiliated to 
the government at a certain level, and the affiliation may help the firm’s finance 
structure. For example, association with government agencies can help obtain credit 
guarantees or collateral assets that banks demand (see Huang 2003). Importantly, 
political affiliations are normally assigned to established firms from the very beginning 
of the registration with the government agency, and therefore they can be considered 
exogenous to the error term of the current growth process.  
At 3-digit SIC level, the instrumental variables SOEs share and Private share are 
defined as SOEs’ and private firms’ market share within the corresponding 3-digit SIC 
industry and province in terms of industrial sales. These instrumental variables are 
designed to capture the market and political environments, which may influence firms’ 
access to financing sources. For example, in the presence of soft-budget constraint (Lin 
et al. 2000), non-SOE firms in a region and industry with high concentration of SOEs 
would find it more difficult to obtain funds from state budgets and bank loans.  
By the same token, it is reasonable to assume that firms in industries or provinces that 
are more open to non-state sector investment are more likely to access foreign finance. 
Included at the regional level are NERI indices of regional financial development (Fan 
et al. 2005), financial market competitiveness, asset allocation marketization, difficulty 
in attracting FDI, and legal environment (measured by the number of lawyers over 
population). In the macro econometric literature, some of these variables are shown to 
be good instruments for accessing finance variables (e.g. Levine 2005).  
It is worth noting that these variables are, by nature, exogenous to firm-level growth 
performance owing to the manner in which they are constructed. To test the relevance 
of the instruments, the authors conducted the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank test (rk test 
in the table) for the rank condition  k X Z rank ≥ ) ' ( , which is a generalization of the 
Anderson Canonical correlation rank test (Anderson 1984), closely related to the 
minimum-eigenvalue test statistics proposed by Cragg and Donald (1993) (also see Hall 
et al. 1996).9 
                                                 
9  The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk LM test is adopted here because of multiple nonlinear endogenous 
regressors, which rule out the application of commonly used tests proposed by Bound et al. (1995) for 
single linear endogenous regressor, Shea (1997) and generalized Anderson’s likelihood ratio for 
multiple linear endogenous regressors, as well as Cragg and Donald test for similar reasons that has 
been used widely.   9
5  Data and summary statistics 
Our dataset draws on the Annual Reports of Industrial Enterprise Statistics compiled by 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, covering the population of Chinese 
state-owned manufacturing enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises with annual 
turnover more than 5 million yuan (about US$620,000) over the period of 1998-2005. 
The sample accounts for nearly 90 per cent of total industrial output. The data exhibit a 
good balance across the manufacturing industries and provinces in China, as shown in 
the Appendix Table 1. 
Firm ownership is classified based on the share of equity capital contributed by different 
sources, such as the state, collective investors, domestic private and foreign investors. 
This differs from the traditional way of classification using firm’s registration 
information that has been questioned recently (e.g. Dollar and Shang-Jin Wei 2007), 
and more appropriately in the cases when registration record cannot signal real firm’s 
ownership structure. Specifically, the ownership is classified as:  
(1) State-owned enterprises (SOE): if state capital is the major source of capital, 
meaning if the share of state capital in total equity finance is equal or more than 50 per 
cent;  
(2) Collective enterprises (COE): if the share of collective capital in total equity finance 
is equal or more than 50 per cent;  
(3) Foreign invested enterprises (FOR): if foreign capital (incl. capital from Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan and foreign countries) is the major source of capital, which means if 
the share of foreign capital is equal or more than 50 per cent;  
(4) Domestic private enterprises (Private): all domestic firms that are not classified as 
SOEs or FORs. This group can further be classified into three: (4a) Private with state 
capital (Private_state): if state capital is less than 50 per cent in total equity finance; (4b) 
Private with foreign capital (Private_for): if foreign capital is less than 50 per cent in 
equity finance and there is no state capital; (4c) Pure private (PPrivate), private firms 
without any state or foreign finance. 
As summarized in Table 1. The majority (56.3 per cent) of the firms in the sample are 
private firms, among which 48.7 per cent of these are pure private firms. There are 
relatively few private firms with state capital (2.2 per cent) and private firms with 
foreign capital (5.4 per cent). The average percentage of SOEs in the sample over 1998-
2005 is 16.9 per cent, but the figure has dropped from 34 per cent in 1998 to 5 per cent 
in 2005 (not presented in the Table), mainly because of SOEs’ privatization and a large-
scale entry of non-state firms. Also 13.5 per cent of the firms are COEs and 13.2 per 
cent are FORs, 60 per cent of which are mainly financed by investors from Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan. 
Firm size is measured in the traditional way by firm’s employment. Although the NBS 
has certain criteria for non-state firms to enter the census, there is still a large number of 
small firms in the data, which ensures a broad coverage in term of firm size. To observe 
the firm size profile in better detail, five size groups of firm are defined, instead of 
conventionally three (small, medium and large, as in for example, Beck et al. 2005, 
2007). As reported in Table 2, they are (1) Size group 1, including firms with under 50   10
employees, amounts to nearly 20 per cent of the total observations. Conventionally, they 
are considered small firms in the empirical literature; (2) Size group 2, including firms 
with between 51 and 100 employees, amounts to nearly 23 per cent of the total 
observations; (3) Size group 3, including firms with between 101 and 200 employees, 
amounts to nearly 24 per cent of the total observations. Groups 2 and 3 are commonly 
considered as medium sized firms in the empirical literature; (4) Size group 4, including 
firms with between 201 and 500 employees, amounts to nearly 21 per cent of the total 
observations; (5) Size group 5, including firms with above 500 employees, amounts to 
12 per cent of the total observations. The last groups are usually regarded as large firms.  
Our previous research suggests that firm ownership structure plays an important role in 
firm financing pattern and performance (see Du and Girma 2007b). We hence take a 
step forward to build a firm size profile by firm ownership. Table 2 also reports the 
sample construction of firms in different size by ownership. One striking feature from 
the distribution is that firm size seems to relate to firm ownership. For example, there 
are more SOEs in the smallest and the largest size groups than other groups, while there 
are more pure private firms (PPrivate) in smaller size groups. PPrivates represent the 
largest ratios in the sample, but relatively their ratio is the lowest in large firms (size 
group 5). The trend appears to be the opposite for private firms with state funds 
(Private_state), private firms with foreign finance (Private_for) and foreign firms 
(FOR), as their ratios tend to be higher in larger size groups. It is interesting to note that 
about 20 per cent of the largest firms are foreign firms.  
Financing pattern of Chinese firms during 1998-2005 is described by the statistics of 
breakdown by size group. Finance from state budgets, domestic bank loans, self-raised 
finance and foreign investments account for 12 per cent, 14 per cent, 60 per cent, and 14 
per cent of firms’ total finance respectively (Figure 1). Self-raised finance has 
throughout the largest share, particularly for small firms. The smallest firms (size group 
1, employees ≤50) have on average 60.5 per cent of total finance coming from self-
raised finance, almost four-fold of their second major financing source (state finance). It 
drops from 66 per cent for small around 40 per cent for largest firms (firms with >500 
employees). The bank loans constitute in total finance seems to steadily increase with 
firm size. On average the share bank loan is around 13.6 per cent for size groups 1 and 2 
(firms with ≤100 employees), and goes beyond 20 per cent for the largest firms. Foreign 
finance seems to favour big firms, although the differences among different size groups 
are not dramatic. It is interesting to notice that on average foreign investment represents 
20 per cent of total finance for bigger firms, nearly at the same level with domestic bank 
loans. 
As known from the previous exercise (Du and Girma 2007b), ownership structure plays 
an important role in firms’ financing mix. This is demonstrated graphically in Figure 1 
in this paper. Using the definition of ownership adopted, only firms with state 
ownership (SOEs and Private_state) employ all four financing sources, firms with 
foreign ownership use three sources except state finance, and firms with state ownership 
enjoy greatest access to bank loans. Self-raised finance supplies the vast majority of 
finance to COEs and pure private firms. It is also interesting to notice that foreign 
investment does not only finance foreign firms, but also domestic private firms and even 
SOEs.  
Also in Figure 1, the financing patterns can be further observed across firm size groups 
within each ownership category. State budget and bank loans are the main financing   11
sources for SOEs, with state budget supplying more than 81 per cent and bank loans 
above 16 per cent. The shares from self-raised finance and foreign investment are 
negligible (about 2 per cent). COEs are financed by self-raised finance and bank loan 
only, and the share of bank loans seems increasing with size. Private_state firms finance 
from all four sources. The average shares of self-raised finance, state budget and foreign 
finance are seen decreasing over the size bands, and bank loan has the opposite trend. 
PPrivate firms, like COEs, only finance from self-raised finance and bank loans. It is 
noticeable that on average the smallest firms have a very small share of bank loans (8 
per cent), the lowest among all indigenous firms, suggesting that small pure private 
firms are probably the most financially constrained among all as far as financing source 
is concerned. Private_for firms finance from three sources apart from state budget, and 
bigger firms seem to have more bank loans than smaller ones. Foreign firms (FOR) 
naturally finance mainly from foreign investment, and the rest quite evenly from self-
raised budget and bank loans. 
Control variables 
Table 3 provides the summary statistics of the variables used in this paper. At firm level 
as in reported in Table 3.1, TFP measure is estimated following the methodology of 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This approach has been widely applied in recent 
productivity literature for its advantage of being able to control for the simultaneity 
between firm’s choice of input levels and unobserved productivity shocks.10 Average 
TFP growth reaches 8.3 per cent over the sample period, with a high standard deviation 
indicating substantial heterogeneity among firms.  
The average firm age is approximately 14 years, and the average firm size in the sample 
is 127 employees.11 Generally older firms tend to be larger according to the mean, 
albeit the large standard errors of both age and firm. The initial TFP level is 1.549 for 
the whole sample, and it seems to relate to firm size, as the average level of TFP is the 
higher for larger firms. The new product sale over total sales is around 3.2 per cent for 
overall sample, ranging from 2 per cent among smallest firms to 7 per cent among 
biggest firms. There are 34 per cent of the firms that are exporters and the average 
export intensity is 17 per cent. Both means of export dummy and export intensity are 
higher among bigger firms than smaller ones. Overall, 43.9 per cent of the firms in our 
sample have governmental affiliations12 at different level. Around 6.2 per cent of the 
firms are affiliated with either central government or provincial governments, and 8.2 
per cent with regional government, and the rest 44 per cent with lower level (i.e. 
prefecture, county) governments. On average the market share of state sector at 3-digit 
SIC classified industrial level is 13 per cent, and private sector is 57.3 per cent. Table 
3.2 also reports the summary statistics of the variables included in the analysis that are 
at regional and/or 3-digit SIC coded industrial level. 
                                                 
10 See Appendix 1 for the detail of TFP estimation. 
11 Both firm age and size take logarithm forms in the model.  
12 Du and Girma (2007a) investigate firms’ affiliations to governments as political connections, and find 
that the connections affect the survival chance of start-up firms.    12
6 Empirical  findings 
6.1  Firm size, financing source and growth 
Table 4 reports the endogeneity-corrected econometric estimates from the TFP growth 
model, based on the overall sample and by firm size. In all cases, the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of finance is emphatically rejected, vindicating the application of correction 
function approach. The Kleibergen-Paap heteroskedastic robust rank condition test 
suggests the strong relevance of the additional instrumental variables employed. 
Controlling for the endogeneity of finance variables, estimates of the correction function 
tell the same story with the selectivity correction estimates about the relative importance 
of the four financing sources (estimation results are reported in Appendix Table 3). 
Although it is unfortunate that there is no known method that can combine the 
selectivity and endogeneity corrections of this case with multiple truncated endogenous 
variables, both estimators that deal with the separate econometric issues deliver 
qualitatively the same message. Focusing on finance variables, it is observed that 
financing sources clearly matter for firm growth, controlling for initial TFP level, firm 
age, size, export, innovation, ownership, industrial, time and regional characteristics. As 
found elsewhere (Du and Girma 2007b), overall sample estimation result (Table 4, 
Column 1) suggests that controlling for the endogeneity of finance variables, there is a 
pecking order of the contribution of financing sources to firm growth: relative to state 
finance, foreign finance leads to highest growth rates, followed by self-raised finance, 
bank loans and state budget.13  
As expected, the results vary among different size groups (Table 4, Columns 2-6). For 
smallest firms in size group 1 (employees <50), the estimates of the coefficients of 
financing source variables are statistically significant and quantitatively different. The 
results generally reflect the above-mentioned pecking order. Overall, the finance 
variable present higher relative marginal effects on firm TFP growth than bigger firms. 
Put differently, the difference of relative importance of financing sources tends to be 
less substantial over increasing size. For example, relative to state finance, foreign 
finance boosts firm growth by around 14.8 per cent higher for size group 1 relative to 
state budget, and only 5.37 per cent for largest firms in size group 5. Self-raised finance 
boost firm growth by 9.52 per cent for size group 1, but only 3.96 per cent for size 
group 5. In sum, financing sources matter much more for smaller firms than bigger 
ones. In particular, self-raised finance and foreign finance are relatively more important 
for small firms than large ones, while bank loan is relative more important than state 
finance, irrespective of firm size.  
Across all estimations, the authors find that initial TFP level enters with a negative and 
significant coefficient, suggesting productivity convergence is taking place. The 
expected inverted-U shaped relationships between firm age and TFP growth, and 
between firm size and growth are observed in small size groups (group 1-3), suggesting 
that on average firms tend to grow faster as they become bigger and older until a turning 
point. The performance-enhancing effect of being an exporter is confirmed by the 
estimates for overall sample estimate and in each size group. An exporter on average 
grows 6.7 per cent faster than a non-exporter, all else being equal. Export intensity has 
                                                 
13 The marginal effects of financing source variables are tested and rejected against statistical equality in 
a pair wise fashion.   13
the opposite effects, in that given being an exporter, higher export intensive firms seem 
to grow less. Innovation variable is found to have a significant positive effect on firm 
TFP growth, which suggests the percentage of new product in total sales relates 
positively to firm productivity growth. The marginal effects of innovation are the largest 
for firms in groups 1 and 5, indicating the positive impact of innovation is most 
pronounced among the smallest as well as the largest firms.14 
There are strong ownership effects. The overall sample estimates suggest that all non-
state firms grow faster than SOEs, which is the base group. All else being equal, non-
SOE firms and foreign firms’ TFP growth is around 7~15 per cent higher than SOEs. 
Interestingly, there seems to be a slight shift of ownership advantage along the size 
distribution. Indigenous ownership advantage of non-SOEs over SOEs in helping firms 
to grow seems to decline as size gets bigger, while the advantage of foreign ownership 
seems to be bigger as size grows bigger. More specifically, the TFP growth of collective 
firms (COEs) of less than 50 employees is 12 per cent higher than the SOEs in the same 
size, while this marginal effect drops to only 4 per cent for size group 4 (that is much 
lower than other ownerships), and finally for firms with more than 500 employees the 
figure drops to 1.9 per cent and insignificant. Similarly, pure private firms’ (PPrivate) 
ownership advantage relative to other firms is more marked for smaller firms than 
bigger ones. In contrast, firms with foreign ownership (both Private_for and FOR) seem 
to enjoy larger advantages among bigger firms than small ones, although the difference 
is not substantial. In addition, very big private firms with state capital possess the most 
advantages among all firms. 
6.2  Financing source, growth and ownership by size group 
Further splitting the sample into firms under different ownership, it is interesting to 
investigate how ownership affects the relationship between financing source and TFP 
growth across different size group. Table 5 reports the estimation results.  
SOE    According to the whole sample estimates, self-raised finance and foreign finance 
has significant and positive effects on firm TFP growth relative to state budget and 
domestic bank loans. The positive impact is mostly concentrated among firms in size 
group 3 (firms with 101-200 employees). Bank loan has a small positive and 
insignificant coefficient for the whole sample and most of the size groups, and it even 
turns to negative for size group 3, which suggests for these firms bank loan has little 
statistical difference from state budget. Quite distinctively bank loans is found to be the 
most effective financing sources for very large firms with more than 500 employees, 
and more specifically 10 per cent of bank loans in total finance will lead to about 6.45 
per cent increase in TFP growth. Also, it is notable that self-raised finance is evidently 
more important than all the other finance for small firms (with less than 100 
employees), for which 10 per cent self-raised finance brings up more than 11 per cent 
TFP growth. But the impact of self-raised finance diminishes as size gets larger.  
                                                 
14 The productivity-enhancing effect of export activity is well documented in the literature, which is also 
the case with less extent for innovativeness. However, we assume that the lagged export (dummy and 
propensity) and lagged innovation variables to have negligible endogenous effect in our model. As 
robustness test, the model specified without these variables does not change the relative importance of 
the financing variable from that of the adopted model.   14
COE    Relative to bank loan, self-raised finance registers positive coefficients but not 
statistically significant for size group 1-3 (<200 employees). For large firms (>200 
employees), bank loan seems to be more supportive, although the effects are not 
statistically significant either.  
Private_state    For private firms with state ownership, not much evidence suggests that 
domestic financing sources help firms grow more than state finance. The exception is in 
size group 5, as again very large firms seem to benefit the most from financing more 
from bank loans.  
PPrivate    For pure private firms, self-raised finance is found to significantly boost TFP 
growth with the marginal effects on average 3.9 per cent, relative to bank loan. This 
suggests that self-raised finance plays a more important role than bank loans for most 
pure private firms. Interestingly, again the authors find that very large firms are 
exceptional, in that there is no statistically significant difference between bank loans 
and self-raised finance for them.  
Private_for    For private firms with foreign finance (foreign stake is less than 50 per 
cent), domestic financing channels start playing an additional effective part for large 
firms (>201 employees). Relative to foreign finance, 10 per cent self-raised finance 
promotes firm TFP growth by 7.4 per cent for firms in size group 4 (201-500 
employees). For the largest firms in size group 5, 10 per cent bank loans (self-raised 
finance) in total finance drive firm growth by about 8.5 per cent (8.3 per cent).  
FOR    The whole sample estimates suggest that for foreign invested firms (foreign 
investment was more than 50 per cent), bank loans appear to be more effective than 
foreign finance, and foreign finance is more effective than self-raised finance. The 
results are quite mixed among different size groups. While the only statistically 
significant marginal effect of bank loan is for firms in size group 3 (firms with 101-
200), it does seem to have a positive impact on foreign firms’ TFP growth relative to 
foreign finance. The negative signs (albeit statistically insignificant) of the self-raised 
finance suggest that it is still not as important for foreign firms as it is for other types of 
firms. 
6.3  Summary of the results and discussions  
In summary, firm size matters for the way in which financing source affects firm TFP 
growth. Finance source affects the growth of small firms more than large firms. If we 
assume firms would choose the most efficient (in boosting growth) financing source in 
an efficient financial market with no lending bias, then our results demonstrate what 
might be the case from the demand side of firm financing – small firms are more 
financially constrained than bigger ones, despite our modelling approach and data used 
tell the story of firm financing from the supply side. Apart from deliberate lending bias 
induced by formal financial system, this may be at odds with the argument that small 
firms cannot afford financial services, especially in poor countries (Greenwood and 
Jovanovic 1990), so that the difficulty in accessing to bank loans has harmed small 
firm’s growth potential.  
It is striking to find that bank loan has only discernible contribution to biggest firms’ 
TFP growth, almost irrespective of ownership. After all, the formal financial sector in   15
China is dominated state-owned commercial banks which pool and direct more than 70 
per cent of the total savings in the economy. If bank loan can be a good proxy of formal 
finance, it may be fair to say that small firms in China suffer from the lack of formal 
financial system support. This is in fact consistent with the notion ‘Grasp the big and let 
go the small’ which has been the national economic policy for years. If financial system 
reform is set out to make access to formal finance easier, then it would be reasonable to 
expect small firms to benefit from the reform.15 Moreover, there is a noticeable positive 
effect of bank loans on foreign invested firms, which may indicate the Chinese formal 
financial institutions have actively participated in foreign invested operations in China.  
The supportive role of finance among small firms growth seems to be undertaken by 
self-raised finance, not only for private firms, but also for COEs and SOEs. It is rather 
clear that it has been an alternative and very important financing channel for the part of 
the economy composed of the SMEs. This complements AQQ’s (2005) finding in that 
informal finance has not only been vital to support private sector growth, but also more 
broadly to support private and small firms growth. It is evident that complementary 
roles of financing sources are undertaken in supporting firms at different stages in their 
life cycle. More specifically informal finance, such as self-raised finance, is more 
important for smaller firms, while formal finance is more important for bigger firms.  
As an ignored financing channel in the literature, foreign investment has played a 
positive role as a financing source in firm growth not only among foreign invested 
enterprises but also domestic firms. There is no clear evidence to suggest that foreign 
investment favours specific size group. The finding also suggests that access to local 
finance may be beneficial for foreign-invested firms, especially for bigger firms, which 
demonstrates the complementarities between indigenous and foreign finance. 
This result offers further evidence on the China’s finance-growth puzzle (see Du and 
Girma 2007b). China’s financial system is an unconventional mix of various formal 
financial sectors and informal financial sectors, which play different roles for different 
types of firms. China should not be considered as a counter-example to the financial and 
growth theory, even though the current theories cannot explain the China puzzle.  
7 Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive firm-level dataset of 1.46 millions observations spanning the 
period of 1998-2005, this study investigates the relationship between firm size, 
financing source and firm TFP growth of Chinese firms. A complete financing profile of 
firms in different size and ownership is developed. Controlling for the endogeneity of 
financing source in the growth equation, firm size is found to play an important role in 
the relationship between financing source and firm TFP growth, despite the differences 
in the financing sources’ contribution of driving TFP growth declines as firm size grows 
bigger. There is evidence to suggest that complementarities of formal finance and 
informal finance, foreign finance and local finance exist for firms at different stage. For 
example, domestic bank loans are generally favourable to big firms, while self-raised 
finance has been found to be more supportive to smaller firms’ growth. Foreign-
invested firms, especially big ones, may benefit from the access to indigenous finance. 
                                                 
15 Although it is not possible to predict in the current paper whether smaller or bigger firms would 
benefit more from the reform.    16
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Appendix 1: TFP estimation method 
The total factor productivity (TFP) measure is estimated following the methodology of 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The advantage of this method lies in controlling for the 
simultaneity between firm’s choice of input levels and unobserved productivity shocks by 
using firm’s intermediate inputs (such as raw materials or electricity) as proxies.  
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i at time t is: 
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where y is log of value added, which is sales net intermediate inputs (m), l is labour input 
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function of capital and intermediate inputs.  t φ  is strictly increasing in the productivity 
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δ  and obtain and estimate of  l β  and  t φ  (up to the intercept) via OLS. 
This constitutes the first stage of the estimation procedure. At the second stage, the 
elasticity of capital  k β  is defined as the solution to  ()
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where  it ϖ  is a nonparametric approximation  [ ] 1 | − it it E ω ω . Since the estimators involve two 
stages, the calculations of the covariance matrix of the parameters must allow for the 
variation due to all of the estimators in the two stages. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) note 
that the derivation of the analytical covariance matrix is quite involved, and suggest the 
bootstrapping procedure to estimate standard errors. In this study 200 bootstrap replications 
are performed. Once consistent estimates of the input elasticities are derived, the log of 
productivity can be obtained as  it k it l it it k l y β β ω ˆ ˆ ˆ − − = . 
The data of industrial value-added and intermediate input are deflated by ex-factory price 
indices published in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). The fixed assets data 
are deflated by fixed asset price indices published in the China Fixed Asset Statistical 
Yearbook and Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). The estimation has been 
conducted by 2-digit SIC industry categories.   21
Table 1: Firm ownership defined by capital structure (1998-2005) 
 
Ownership Definition  Freq.  Per  cent 
State-owned enterprises (SOE)  If state capital is the major source of capital, which means if 
State capital is equal or more than 50 per cent in equity finance  243,445  16.9 
Collective enterprises (COE)  If collective capital is equal or more than 50 per cent in equity 
finance 194,354  13.5 
Private enterprises:  All domestic firms which are not classified as SOEs or FORs  809,264  56.3 
          among which:      
           - Private with state capital 
(Private_state) 
If state capital is less than 50 per cent in equity finance 
32,251 2.2 
           - Pure private enterprises (PPrivate)  Private firms without any state or foreign finance  699,192  48.7 
           - Private with foreign capital 
(Private_for) 
If foreign capital is less than 50 per cent in equity finance and 
there is no state capital  77,821  5.4 
Foreign invested enterprises  (FOR)  If foreign capital (incl. capital from Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwan and foreign countries) is the major source of capital, 
which means if foreign capital is equal or more than 50 per 
cent in equity finance  189,952  13.2 
Total   1,437,015  100.0 
Note: The statistics are calculated using the dataset used in this paper based on existing observations. 
Source: This table shows the classification of firm ownership and according to which the ownership structure of the data. The 
definitions of firm ownership in the table and a detailed description are also given in the main text Section 5 Data and Summary 
Statistics.  22








SOE COE PPrivate_STATE  PPrivate  Private_for    FOR 
1  (<=50) 287,241  19.99  21.77  13.07  1.15  52.40 3.27  8.34 
2 (51–100)  329,868 22.96  11.79  13.87  1.50  57.37  4.61  10.86 
3 (101–200)  345,251 24.03  12.47  14.93  1.97  51.63  5.76  13.25 
4 (201–500)  299,823 20.86  16.26  14.25  2.78  43.00  6.96  16.75 
5 (>500)  174,832  12.17  28.73  9.61  5.08  29.91  7.13  19.55 
Total 1,437,015  100.00  16.90  13.50  2.20  48.70  5.40  13.20 
 
Note: Size groups are defined according to the total number of employees, for example, size 
group 1 includes firms with no more than 50 employees; size group 2 includes firms with 
employees between 51 and 100. This table gives information on the sample composition of our 
dataset. According to Column 3, there are 19.99 per cent observations in the sample are the 
smallest firms with no more than 50 employees. The size composition by firm ownership is also 
reported in Columns 4-9, where the figures are the percentage of firms of one type of ownership 
in total number of firms in each size group. For example, 21.77 per cent of Size group 1 are 
state-owned enterprises (SOE, Column 4), and another 52.4 per cent in this group are pure 
private enterprises (PPrivate). 
Source: The statistics are calculated using the dataset used in this paper based on existing 
observations.   23
Table 3: Summary statistics 
Table 3.1: Variables at firm level 
Size group  Total  1 (<50)  3 (51–100) 4  (101–200) 5  (201–500)  6 (>500) 
Performance indicators             
TFP growth  0.083  0.0566  0.0922  0.0935  0.0904  0.0801 
 (0.643)  (0.6062)  (0.5560)  (0.5424)  (0.5394)  (0.5183) 
Financing source            
Share of state budget  0.1187  0.1543  0.0853  0.0893  0.1132  0.1925 
 (0.2945)  (0.3420)  (0.2586)  (0.2606)  (0.2834)  (0.3360) 
Share of bank loans  0.137  0.0974  0.1092  0.1322  0.1619  0.2119 
 (0.252)  (0.2241)  (0.2301)  (0.2499)  (0.2683)  (0.2824) 
Share of self-raised finance  0.602  0.6567  0.6893  0.6372  0.5485  0.3925 
 (0.428)  (0.4316)  (0.4033)  (0.4144)  (0.4245)  (0.4084) 
Share of foreign investment  0.141  0.0916  0.1163  0.1412  0.1763  0.2030 
  (0.315) (0.2623)  (0.2889)  (0.3137)  (0.3438)  (0.3649) 
Firm characteristics            
Firm age  13.664  10.9833  10.9257  12.9184  15.7725  21.0884 
 (13.323)  (11.0040)  (10.5348)  (12.1958)  (14.3410)  (17.7280) 
Firm size (log of 
employees)  4.8408 3.2353  4.2604  4.9297  5.6944  6.9346 
 (1.2048)  (0.6520)  (0.2003)  (0.1987)  (0.2606)  (0.6655) 
Initial TFP level  1.549  1.389  1.462  1.520  1.675  1.709 
 (2.209)  (1.996)  (1.698)  (1.977)  (2.071)  (2.304) 
Innovation (new product in 
total sales)  0.032 0.0200  0.0242  0.0260  0.0348  0.0700 
 (0.254)  (0.2798)  (0.3213)  (0.2467)  (0.1732)  (0.1993) 
Export, dummy  0.341  0.1101  0.1809  0.2510  0.3359  0.4777 
 (0.474)  (0.3130)  (0.3850)  (0.4336)  (0.4723)  (0.4995) 
Export intensity  0.170  0.0804  0.1252  0.1768  0.2330  0.2691 
 (0.341)  (0.2489)  (0.3011)  (0.3472)  (0.3826)  (0.3887) 
Affiliation to:            
Central government (%)  1.4  0.8  0.9  1.5  5.3  1.7 
Provincial government (%)  4.7  3.3  3.7  5.0  9.4  4.8 
Regional government (%)  8.2  7.0  8.4  12.5  21.0  10.5 
Governments at other 
levels (%)  43.9  48.7  45.1  40.6  32.6  43.2 
Weight in the whole 
sample (%)  100 19.99 22.96  24.03  20.86  12.17 
   24
Table 3.2: Variables at regional/industrial level 
Regional/Industrial level indicator    
Industrial concentration (Herfindal index)  0.091  (0.1316) 
Market share (in sales) of the state sector by 3-digit SIC 
industry/region/year 
0.13 (0.189) 
Market share (in sales) of the private sector by 3-digit SIC 
industry/region/year 
0.573 (0.248) 
Financial development (bank loans to private sector over regional 
GDP) 
0.008 (0.006) 
Financial market competitiveness  6.268  (1.349) 
Asset allocation marketization  5.677  (2.89) 
Difficulty in attracting FDI  3.731  (2.487) 
Law (total number of lawyers over total population in a province)  5.233  (5.111) 
Intellectual property right protection  5.526  (4.964) 
 
Data source: The statistics are calculated using the dataset used in this paper based on existing 
observations. Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses.    25
Table 4: Firm size, financing sources and firm TFP growth 
Size group  Overall  1 (<50)  2 (51–100) 3  (101–200) 4  (201–500)  5 (>500) 
Finance        






  (0.0073)  (0.027) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.011) 







  (0.0060)  (0.025) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.010) 







  (0.0089)  (0.042) (0.029) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) 
Reference group  State budget  State budget  State budget  State budget  State budget  State budget 
Firm characteristics        
TFP  level  -0.218*** -0.238*** -0.228*** -0.224*** -0.247*** -0.220*** 
 (0.0022)  (0.017)  (0.0063)  (0.0053)  (0.0043)  (0.0041) 
Age -0.0128  0.0813*  0.0705**  0.0617**  0.0285  -0.0118 
  (0.0090)  (0.051) (0.029) (0.024) (0.020) (0.027) 
Age-squared -0.509***  -2.512***  -2.447***  -2.073***  -0.987**  0.162 
  (0.19) (0.97) (0.62) (0.50) (0.44) (0.52) 
Size  -0.0107* 0.218** 0.285*** 0.132** -0.227*** -0.0225 
  (0.005) (0.032) (0.055) (0.055) (0.047) (0.040) 
Size-squared 1.964***  -2.245***  -1.923***  0.349  4.062***  2.124*** 
  (0.076)  (0.77) (0.63) (0.55) (0.42) (0.28) 
Exporter  0.0674*** 0.0493*** 0.0585*** 0.0615*** 0.0722*** 0.0353*** 
 (0.0033)  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.0077)  (0.0062)  (0.0063) 
Export  intensity  -0.167*** -0.116*** -0.141*** -0.150*** -0.174*** -0.155*** 
  (0.0058)  (0.034) (0.017) (0.011)  (0.0097)  (0.010) 
Innovation 0.0379*  0.0916***  0.0370**  0.0120  0.0857***  0.106*** 
  (0.021) (0.042) (0.017) (0.023) (0.011) (0.016) 
Ownership        
COE 0.0709***  0.119***  0.0947***  0.0720***  0.0406***  0.0193 
  (0.0061)  (0.023) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
PPrivate_STATE 0.130***  0.134***  0.114***  0.122***  0.104***  0.113*** 
  (0.0063)  (0.029) (0.028) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) 
PPrivate 0.138***  0.164***  0.144***  0.140***  0.115***  0.107*** 
  (0.0055)  (0.023) (0.019) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Private_for 0.139***  0.103***  0.115***  0.131***  0.115***  0.143*** 
  (0.0063)  (0.029) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
FOR 0.145***  0.128***  0.121***  0.135***  0.134***  0.117*** 
  (0.0084)  (0.031) (0.026) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
Constant 1.385***  0.545***  0.815***  1.038***  2.119***  1.402*** 
  (0.035)  (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) 
Observations 444966  53556  89262  112637  112591  76920 
R-squared  0.18 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.20 
Exogeneity test for 
correction function 
Chi
2 (18) = 
9552.05;  












p = .0000 
Chi
2 (28) = 
3010.24; 










2 (26) = 
27125.14;  












p = .0000 
Chi
2 (26) = 
27125.14; 




p = .0000 
Note 1: The dependent variable is firm’s TFP growth, estimated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method 
(see Appendix 1 for details). Note 2: The estimator is the correction function approach by Wooldridge 
(2005), applied to correct for endogeneity bias. The reported joint significance of correction function and 
the interaction terms indicate the existence of endogeneity. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistics 
provide the over-identification tests for the included instrumental variables. Note 3: All estimations include 
the full sets of industry (2-digit SIC level), regional dummies (province level) and year dummies, each set 
being jointly significant in all specifications. Note 4: 
§ indicates that the coefficients of pair-wise financing 
source variables are tested using F-test, and there are statistically significant differences at 1 per cent 
significance level between the estimates of the coefficients of bank loans and self-raised finance, between 
those of bank loans and foreign finance, and between self-raised finance and foreign finance. Note 5: 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   26
Table 5: Firm size, financing sources and firm TFP growth: the role of ownership structure 
Size group  Overall  1 (<50)  2 (51–100) 3  (101–200) 4  (201–500)  5 (>500) 
Panel I: SOE 
Bank  loan  0.0164  0.0686  0.0232  -0.0639* -0.00479 0.0645*** 
 (0.012)  (0.043)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.029)  (0.020) 
Self-raised finance  0.0725***
§ 0.117***  0.114***  0.0621**  0.0340  -0.0135 
 (0.015)  (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.023) 
Foreign finance  0.229***
§ -0.341  0.0382  0.365***  -0.0308  -0.144 
 (0.056)  (0.23)  (0.18)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.097) 
Reference group: state budget 
Panel II: COE 
Self-raised finance  0.0155  0.0276  0.0275  0.0176  -0.00811  -0.0139 
 (0.0098)  (0.035)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.021) 
Reference group: bank loans 
Panel III: Private_state 
Bank loan  -0.0494  0.172  -0.132  -0.214***  -0.0591  0.0765** 
 (0.031)  (0.18)  (0.11)  (0.068)  (0.061)  (0.038) 
Self-raised finance  -0.0224  -0.00436  -0.0598  -0.128**  -0.0578  0.0312 
 (0.024)  (0.15)  (0.086)  (0.062)  (0.052)  (0.038) 
Foreign finance  0.162***  0.190  0.248*  0.0437  0.0807  0.0767 
 (0.028)  (0.26)  (0.13)  (0.085)  (0.070)  (0.063) 
Reference group: state budget 
Panel IV: PPrivate 
Self-raised finance  0.0392***  0.0413**  0.0211*  0.0361***  0.0431***  0.0176 
 (0.0044)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.0072)  (0.0094)  (0.011) 
Reference group: bank loans 
Panel V: Private_for 
Bank loan  0.0328  0.155  0.0415  -0.0569  0.0513  0.0849** 
 (0.020)  (0.20)  (0.072)  (0.057)  (0.047)  (0.043) 
Self-raised finance  0.0288  0.0242  -0.0605  -0.0105  0.0742*  0.0829** 
 (0.019)  (0.081)  (0.039)  (0.025)  (0.039)  (0.036) 
Reference group: foreign finance 
Panel VI: FOR 
Bank loan  0.0681***  -0.0458  0.0845  0.132***  0.0473  0.0500 
 (0.022)  (0.088)  (0.054)  (0.047)  (0.032)  (0.041) 
Self-raised finance  -0.0298***  0.00465  -0.0742***  -0.00980  -0.0219  -0.0292 
 (0.011)  (0.040)  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.029) 
Reference group: foreign finance 
Note 1: The dependent variable is firm’s TFP growth, estimated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method 
(see Appendix 1 for details). Note 2: The estimator is the correction function approach by Wooldridge 
(2005), applied to correct for endogeneity bias. The reported joint significance of correction function and 
the interaction terms indicate the existence of endogeneity. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistics 
provide the over-identification tests for the included instrumental variables. Note 3: All estimations include 
the full sets of industry (2-digit SIC level), regional dummies (province level) and year dummies, each set 
being jointly significant in all specifications. Note 4: 
§ indicates that the coefficients of pair-wise financing 
source variables are tested using F-test, and there are statistically significant differences at 1 per cent 
significance level between the estimates of the coefficients of bank loans and self-raised finance, between 
those of bank loans and foreign finance, and between self-raised finance and foreign finance. Note 5: 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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foreign finance 0.141 0.092 0.116 0.141 0.176 0.203
self-raised finance 0.605 0.657 0.689 0.637 0.549 0.393
bank loans 0.136 0.097 0.109 0.132 0.162 0.212
state budget 0.119 0.154 0.085 0.089 0.113 0.193








foreign finance 0.008 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.009
self-raised finance 0.012 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.030
bank loans 0.166 0.192 0.218 0.258 0.305
state budget 0.813 0.770 0.742 0.703 0.655














self-raised finance 0.882 0.847 0.816 0.787 0.765
bank loans 0.118 0.153 0.184 0.213 0.235
state budget 00000













foreign finance 0.215 0.225 0.217 0.186 0.156
self-raised finance 0.402 0.402 0.395 0.394 0.379
bank loans 0.123 0.129 0.163 0.215 0.275

















self-raised finance 0.920 0.901 0.875 0.840 0.779
bank loans 0.080 0.099 0.125 0.160 0.221
state budget 00000










foreign finance 0.311 0.302 0.288 0.272 0.230
self-raised
finance
0.636 0.633 0.630 0.623 0.617















foreign finance 0.885 0.879 0.881 0.883 0.886
self-raised
finance
0.075 0.079 0.071 0.065 0.052











Note 1: This set of figures depicts the financing mix of Chinese enterprises by firm size and 
ownership structure during 1998–2005. The statistics reported in the graphs are calculated 
using the dataset used in this paper. See details of the data and summary statistics in Section 5. 
Note 2: The reported means of financing sources by ownership in the table are tested for 
statistical difference by pair wise ownership groups, and the results suggest the access to each 
financing source variable is statistically different among firms under different ownership at 1 per 
cent significant level. 
Note 3: See the definitions of ownership in Section 5 and the statistics in Table 1.   29
Appendix  
Appendix Table 1: Financial sectors in China 

































Ministry of Finance, through central government and local government departments.  State  budget  appropriations  through 
budget allocation via central and local 
governments; investments in a firm as 
equity capital from the state. 
Bank loans from banks other than non-








Finance from capital market, mainly 
from listed firms in stock markets. This 
would be reflected as firms’ equity 
capital, although it role is limited, as 
there are only 1337 listed companies in 
the two stock markets in China by the 
end of 2004, which represent only 1% 
of the total national industrial value-
added, this financing channel. 
Central Bank (the 
People’s Bank of 
China) 



















Rural credit cooperatives 
Urban credit cooperatives 
(city commercial banks) 






















































Self-raised finance, as a major source 
of equity capital, broadly includes 
finance from individual capital, 
collective capital, and corporate or legal 
person’s capital. There can be an array 
of channels and mechanisms that 
operate self-raised finance as indicated 
in the column on the left. 
Note 1:  This table shows the structure of domestic financial sectors in China. Panel I and Panel II schematize the formal or regulated financial sectors, and informal financial 
arrangements and agents. The right-hand column lists corresponding financial channels available at firm level from each sector, which are also considered in empirical 
analysis.  
Note 2:  The financial channel that is not included in this table but used by many Chinese firms is foreign investments. For further details, see discussion in Sections 3.2 and 5.  












Professional moneylenders; Mobile bankers; Private 
individuals from upper-income groups 
Landlord 
Trade-moneylenders; Equipment suppliers; Produce 
traders; Store owners 
Associations 
Savings arrangements 
Combined savings and 
credit arrangements 
Fixed-fund associations; 
Mutual aid associations 
Savings club 
Informal credit unions 




Indigenous banker pawnbrokers; Finance 
companies; Investment companies; Leasing 
companies; Hire-purchase companies   31
Appendix Table 2: Dataset structure 
Appendix Table 1.1 By year 
Year Freq. Per  cent 
1998 146,553  10.2 
1999 137,059  9.54 
2000 143,158  9.96 
2001 154,757  10.77 
2002 165,154  11.49 
2003 180,118  12.53 
2004 258,879  18.02 
2005 251,337  17.49 
Total 1,437,015  100 
 
Appendix Table 2.2 By 2-digit SIC industrial classification 
sic2 Freq.  Per  cent 
13-Food processing  93,526  6.51 
14-Food production  38,749  2.7 
15-Beverage industry  26,778  1.86 
16-Tabacco industry  2,250  0.16 
17-Textile industry  120,698  8.4 
18-Garments and other fibre products  69,052  4.81 
19-Leather, furs, down and related products  33,838  2.35 
20-Timber processing  27,508  1.91 
21-Furniture manufacturing  15,758  1.1 
22-Papermaking and paper products  44,172  3.07 
23-Printing and record medium reproduction  32,781  2.28 
24-Cultural, educational and sports goods  18,209  1.27 
25-Petroleum refining and coking  10,547  0.73 
26-Raw chemical materials and chemical products  106,664  7.42 
27-Medical products  30,982  2.16 
28-Chemical fibre  7,409  0.52 
29-Rubber products  17,007  1.18 
30-Plastic products  64,740  4.51 
31-Nonmetal mineral products  127,340  8.86 
32-Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals  34,326  2.39 
33-Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals  26,410 1.84 
34-Metal products  76,678  5.34 
35-Ordinary machinery  102,273  7.12 
36-Special purposes equipment  60,200  4.19 
37-Transport equipment  66,760  4.65 
39-Other electronic equipment   75,724  5.27 
40-Electrical equipment and machinery  49,561  3.45 
41-Electronic and communication appliances  22,444  1.56 
42-Meters and office appliances  30,298  2.11 
43-Other manufacturing  4,333 0.3 
Total  1,437,015 100   32
Appendix Table 3: Firm size, financing sources and firm TFP growth: OLS, Outline robust 
regression and Selection model estimation 
Appendix Table 3.1: OLS estimation results 
Size group  1 (<50)  2 (51–100) 3  (101–200) 4  (201–500)  5 (>500) 
Finance          
Bank loan  0.120***
§ 0.0685***
§ 0.0263*
§ 0.0215  0.0169 
 (0.0225)  (0.0180)  (0.0149)  (0.0132)  (0.0119) 
Self-raised finance  0.127***
§ 0.0654***
§ 0.0332**
§ 0.0194  0.00119 
 (0.0212)  (0.0169)  (0.0142)  (0.0129)  (0.0119) 
Foreign finance  0.214***
§ 0.132***
§ 0.0499**
§ 0.00175  -0.0134 
 (0.0342)  (0.0237)  (0.0197)  (0.0172)  (0.0167) 
Firm characteristics          
TFP level  -0.191***  -0.194***  -0.187***  -0.184***  -0.140*** 
 (0.00509)  (0.00392)  (0.00325)  (0.00350)  (0.00364) 
Age -0.999*  -0.867**  -1.274***  -1.713***  -0.964*** 
 (0.513)  (0.340)  (0.272)  (0.250)  (0.279) 
Age-squared 0.197***  -0.0405  0.0400*  0.0321  -0.205*** 
 (0.0326)  (0.0255)  (0.0243)  (0.0211)  (0.0163) 
Size -2.837***  -0.176  -0.983***  -0.631***  1.971*** 
 (0.431)  (0.299)  (0.259)  (0.202)  (0.123) 
Size-squared -0.00321  -0.00260  0.0219*  0.0424***  0.0151 
 (0.0234)  (0.0159)  (0.0132)  (0.0126)  (0.0148) 
Exporter 0.0316*  0.0506***  0.0640***  0.0778***  0.0514*** 
 (0.0167)  (0.00903)  (0.00663)  (0.00585)  (0.00575) 
Export intensity  -0.0789***  -0.106***  -0.139***  -0.168***  -0.121*** 
 (0.0223)  (0.0123)  (0.00878)  (0.00794)  (0.00832) 
Innovation 0.0961***  0.0426**  0.0142*  0.0908***  0.0866*** 
 (0.0313)  (0.0169)  (0.00830)  (0.0115)  (0.0110) 
Ownership          
COE 0.202***  0.134***  0.0918***  0.0525***  0.0179* 
 (0.0200)  (0.0147)  (0.0119)  (0.0105)  (0.0105) 
PPrivate_STATE 0.165***  0.126***  0.120*** 0.0966***  0.0868*** 
 (0.0299)  (0.0210)  (0.0151)  (0.0125)  (0.00937) 
PPrivate 0.182***  0.132***  0.117***  0.0895***  0.0812*** 
 (0.0189)  (0.0140)  (0.0114)  (0.00975)  (0.00840) 
Private_for 0.148***  0.127***  0.128***  0.110***  0.124*** 
 (0.0246)  (0.0167)  (0.0135)  (0.0114)  (0.0106) 
FOR 0.176***  0.124***  0.126***  0.119***  0.109*** 
 (0.0297)  (0.0199)  (0.0165)  (0.0138)  (0.0134) 
Constant 1.136***  1.483***  1.670***  1.616***  1.850*** 
 (0.252)  (0.0650)  (0.0801)  (0.0685)  (0.0714) 
Observations 53840  89563  112966  112908  77161 
R-squared 0.081  0.103  0.125  0.150  0.154 
Note 1: The dependent variable is firm’s TFP growth, estimated by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method 
(see Appendix 1 for details). Note 2: The estimator in A.Table 3.1 is OLS with the clustered robust 
standard errors. The Estimator in Appendix Table 3.2 is Outlier robust regression, to deal with firm 
heterogeneity (Rousseeuw and Leroy 1987). The estimator in Appendix Table 3.3 is the selection model 
by Wooldridge (1995), as an extension to the standard Heckman selection method. The reported joint 
significance of yearly non-selection hazard variables at the bottom of the table validates the method. Note 
3: All estimations include the full sets of industry (2-digit SIC level), regional dummies (province level) and 
year dummies, each set being jointly significant in all specifications. Note 4: 
§ indicates that the coefficients 
of pair-wise financing source variables are tested using F-test, and there are statistically significant 
differences at 1 per cent significance level between the estimates of the coefficients of bank loans and self-
raised finance, between those of bank loans and foreign finance, and between self-raised finance and 
foreign finance. Note 5: Whites’ robust standard errors in parentheses in Appendix Table 3.1; standard 
error in parentheses in Appendix Table 3.2; bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses in Appendix 
Table 3.3, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   33
Appendix Table 3.2: Outline robustness regression results 
Size group  1 (<50)  2 (51–100)  3 (101–200)  4 (201–500)  5 (>500) 
Finance          
Bank loan  0.105***
§ 0.0568***
§ 0.0288***
§ 0.0164*  0.0125 
 (0.0147)  (0.0121)  (0.0100)  (0.00883)  (0.00848) 
Self-raised finance  0.0868***
§ 0.0461***
§ 0.0307***
§ 0.00864  -0.000290 
 (0.0137)  (0.0113)  (0.00958)  (0.00861)  (0.00853) 
Foreign finance  0.108***
§ 0.0931***
§ 0.0459***
§ -0.00299  -0.00971 
 (0.0242)  (0.0166)  (0.0136)  (0.0120)  (0.0122) 
Firm characteristics          
TFP level  -0.112***  -0.120***  -0.119***  -0.119***  -0.084*** 
 (0.00259)  (0.00197)  (0.00166)  (0.00153)  (0.00160) 
Age -0.634*  -0.539**  -0.838***  -1.266***  -0.935*** 
 (0.379)  (0.262)  (0.211)  (0.195)  (0.205) 
Age-squared 0.0961***  -0.058***  0.0232  0.0241*  -0.130*** 
 (0.0193)  (0.0169)  (0.0142)  (0.0137)  (0.00949) 
Size -1.451***  0.124  -0.691***  -0.504***  1.247*** 
 (0.247)  (0.193)  (0.150)  (0.131)  (0.0729) 
Size-squared -0.00413  -0.00471  0.0118  0.0313***  0.0296*** 
 (0.0179)  (0.0125)  (0.0103)  (0.00986)  (0.0109) 
Exporter 0.0247*  0.0379***  0.0418***  0.0535***  0.0284*** 
 (0.0139)  (0.00750)  (0.00562)  (0.00478)  (0.00442) 
Export intensity  -0.0583***  -0.0829***  -0.0917***  -0.114***  -0.0733*** 
 (0.0183)  (0.0100)  (0.00738)  (0.00628)  (0.00630) 
Innovation 0.0383*  0.0297**  0.0569***  0.0736***  0.0564*** 
 (0.0231)  (0.0127)  (0.0100)  (0.00881)  (0.00826) 
Ownership          
COE 0.126***  0.0735***  0.0543***  0.0330***  0.0107 
 (0.0132)  (0.00996)  (0.00817)  (0.00720)  (0.00760) 
PPrivate_STATE 0.0925***  0.0701***  0.0604***  0.0579***  0.0435*** 
 (0.0221)  (0.0142)  (0.0110)  (0.00885)  (0.00722) 
PPrivate 0.111***  0.0751***  0.0694***  0.0585***  0.0442*** 
 (0.0122)  (0.00939)  (0.00768)  (0.00659)  (0.00614) 
Private_for 0.111***  0.0641***  0.0746***  0.0723***  0.0706*** 
 (0.0176)  (0.0119)  (0.00953)  (0.00825)  (0.00808) 
FOR 0.134***  0.0707***  0.0734***  0.0705***  0.0642*** 
 (0.0214)  (0.0140)  (0.0113)  (0.00977)  (0.00985) 
Constant 0.447***  0.973***  0.963***  1.086***  1.108*** 
 (0.129)  (0.0427)  (0.0389)  (0.0415)  (0.0385) 
Observations 53840  89563  112965  112908  77161 
R-squared 0.062  0.095  0.126  0.167  0.188 
 
Note: as in Appendix Table 3.1.   34
Appendix Table 3.3: Selection model estimation results 
Size group  1 (<50)  2 (51–100)  3 (101–200)  4 (201–500)  5 (>500) 
Finance          





 (0.0178)  (0.0048)  (0.0123)  (0.0110)  (0.0106) 
Self-raised finance  0.0581***
§ 0.00411***
§ 0.0359**
§ 0.0240** 0.00884 
 (0.0166)  (0.0038)  (0.0117)  (0.0108)  (0.0106) 






 (0.0281)  (0.0196)  (0.0163)  (0.0144)  (0.0148) 
Firm characteristics          
TFP level  -0.428***  -0.407***  -0.394***  -0.396***  -0.341*** 
 (0.00521)  (0.00402)  (0.00343)  (0.00379)  (0.00422) 
Age 0.0643  -0.681**  -0.917***  -1.537***  -1.068*** 
 (0.434)  (0.294)  (0.233)  (0.218)  (0.245) 
Age-squared -0.259***  -0.351***  -0.266***  -0.273***  -0.425*** 
 (0.0259)  (0.0222)  (0.0212)  (0.0182)  (0.0136) 
Size 2.026***  3.089***  2.257***  2.618***  4.306*** 
 (0.337)  (0.257)  (0.227)  (0.175)  (0.106) 
Size-squared -0.112***  -0.066***  -0.044***  -0.0193*  -0.035*** 
 (0.0200)  (0.0138)  (0.0113)  (0.0110)  (0.0131) 
Exporter -0.0613***  -0.0225***  -0.00707  0.0168***  0.00829 
 (0.0149)  (0.00787)  (0.00591)  (0.00506)  (0.00506) 
Export intensity  -0.0519***  -0.0805***  -0.116***  -0.166***  -0.138*** 
 (0.0196)  (0.0106)  (0.00776)  (0.00677)  (0.00728) 
Innovation 0.00113  -0.0226  0.00191  0.0452***  0.0385*** 
 (0.0242)  (0.0140)  (0.00247)  (0.00996)  (0.00955) 
Ownership          
COE 0.460***  0.395***  0.350***  0.329***  0.279*** 
 (0.0163)  (0.0123)  (0.0101)  (0.00918)  (0.00970) 
PPrivate_STATE 0.0377  0.0251  0.0184  0.0128 0.0494*** 
 (0.0247)  (0.0168)  (0.0129)  (0.0102)  (0.00801) 
PPrivate 0.137***  0.114***  0.105***  0.0895***  0.0925*** 
 (0.0149)  (0.0113)  (0.00933)  (0.00801)  (0.00738) 
Private_for -0.0192  -0.0152  -0.00895  -0.0106  0.0220** 
 (0.0200)  (0.0137)  (0.0111)  (0.00942)  (0.00923) 
FOR -0.511***  -0.451***  -0.397***  -0.376***  -0.313*** 
 (0.0253)  (0.0171)  (0.0140)  (0.0123)  (0.0124) 
Constant -1.180  1.417***  0.0861  0.209  0.300*** 
 (0.916)  (0.0615)  (0.247)  (0.140)  (0.0716) 
Observations 53840  89563  112966  112908  77161 
R-squared 0.352  0.347  0.356  0.374  0.352 
Specification test for 
selection model 
Chi






























Note: as in Appendix Table 3.1. 
 